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distort, or ignore the spontaneous appreciation of nature,
which is a valued experience of many persons. It is
not, however, only professional philosophers whose
perspectives on nature have been affected by this
anthropocentrism; anyone who has taught philosophy
has encountered students who have somehow been
already imbued with views akin to Sartre's concepts of
en soi (in itself) and pour soi (for itself) as these apply
to the physical world, while there has been little in 20th
century Western philosophy to foster active appreciation
of other-than-human aspects of nature. To be sure, there
is now a burgeoning of world-philosophy, and the
situation is different with some Eastern thought--e.g.,
the Zen response to birds, animals, and trees. But while
an occasional 20th century Western philosopher is
influenced by this or another Eastern attitude toward
nature, not all Western philosophers are open to the
appeal of Eastern thought, and a Western fostering of
love of nature is needed to counteract the dominance
of 20th century anthropocentrism.
A person whose philosophical education began before
1950 may have encountered American Hegelianism, for
which (according to most interpretations) no aspect of
nature "in-itself' is a suitable object ofany human interest
And by the early 20th century there began the rapid
succession to dominaoce of anthropocentric and implicitly
anti-realist philosophical positions, notably critical
realism, logical empiricism, instrumentalism, secular

My thesis is that experience with, appreciation of,
and concern for fostering the well-being of animals on
the part of professional philosophers may have
beneficial effects within philosophical inquiry and
hence within our profession as teachers. This
appreciation and concern for animals I will call the
"agapetic attitude" (from "agape"). After providing
background concerning human relations to other-thanhuman aspects of nature, I will argue that cultivation of
the agapetic attitude toward animals may improve our
capacities for observation and interpretation of what
we encounter in the physical world; may lead to
contemporary discernment of the value of the traditional
understanding of the philosopher's attitude toward
inquiry, and may bring about a burgeoning of creativity
in respect to currently troubled realist/anti-realist
discussions among philosophers. I will argue this on
historical, experiential, and speculative grounds.
I. Anthropocentrism in 20th Century Philosophy

PHILOSOPHY

The mind and spirit of many contemporary Western
philosophers have been shaped by diverse anthropocentric views which at least implicitly diminish,
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existentialism, several varieties of phenomenology,
and-most recently----<leconstructionism. The antirealism of these views is seen in the fact that each of
them denies at least one of the four presuppositions of
the agapetic attitude, which is necessarily based in the
acceptance of a realist interpretation of nature. These
presuppositions are that entities and processes of the
physical world (e.g., and here specifically, the animals)
have their "real nature" apart from human interest in
them or opinions about them; that some of these can to
some extent be known; that such knowledge has a
profound existential effect within human life; and that
commitment to learning about these objective things
and states of affairs has great axiological import for the
human spirit. Taken together these four presuppositions
serve as a working definition of some forms of what is
currently known as "realism." And I suggest that the
denial of anyone of these presuppositions constitutes a
satisfactory working definition of "anti-realism."

all humans· but which only those with the requisite
features of spirit and mind will discern, while among
these only some will respond with great appreciation
and a desire to foster them and our awareness of theme.g., the appeal of stars, mountains, birds and bird songs;
of the plants we grow from seed and in which we watch
daily the maturation of an organism in which fragrance,
colors, and mathematical designs are inherent; and the
perceptiveness, resourcefulness, needs and endearing
characteristics of the animals to which we give an
important role in our personal lives. And finally, only
the person capable of the agapetic attitude will note
and wish to alleviate the suffering of the animals.
On the other hand, anthropocentric interpretations
of aspects of nature, such as those to which I have just
called attention, do not illumine either the intrinsic or
the instrumental values these have for some persons.
First, a Hegelian interpretation of them circumvents the
fact that it is precisely as other-than-human that these
aspects of nature are precious to some of us. For
example, I cherish as intrinsically valuable the delight,
wonder, and mystery I know in the presence of the
sparrows and squirrels outside my study window, while
I am also grateful that these experiences leaven and
revitalize my spirit.
Second, I cannot accept an anti-realist interpretation
of nature as I know it in these appreciative responses.
Undeniably, it is through my experiences that I know
the aspects of nature which occasion these responses in
me. Yet central to these experiences is the fact, which
is also undeniable, that I am convinced that in them
something of the surprise which always accompanies
true wonder is given me, something I did not and could
not put there, and something which invitationally calls
me out of myself, giving me some very welcome
moments of freedom from my self-concerns and from
the self-consciousness to which a phenomenological
stance can lead.
Third, I also value both instrumentally and
intrinsically my desire to be actively concerned with
fostering positive human responses to these aspects of
nature. Hence, I cannot accept a deconstructionist
suggestion that I experiment with supplanting this
attitude with indifference to them.! For I have a fund
of experience which, I believe, supports my conclusion
that I would do harm to myself as philosopher and as
human being if I gave up (e.g., "deconstructed") my
presupposition that because these experiences appeal
to my capacities for wonder, spiritual and intellectual

II. Experiences with Nature Ignored or Distorted
by Anthropocentrism
Clearly, defense of a speculative hypothesis requires
articulation and defense of its presuppositions. Defense
of all the presuppositions which shaped my hypothesis
concerning the philosophical value of the agapetic
attitude would, however, be too extensive for this essay.
In this context only the following presupposition requires
attention:ideally, any philosophical understanding of the
physical world will, according to its own perspective,
encompass human experiences within nature in a manner
that neither rejects nor distorts them.
Anthropocentric interpretations of nature, on the
other hand, fail to illumine adequately much human
experience with nature which is of great significance
to many humans and potentially to philosophical
inquiry. There are features of our natural environment
of which even the most consistent anti-realist must be
aware, while in his concern with them he almost
certainly introduces some realist considerations: e.g.,
the loci of possible earthquakes or the threat of a virus
whose "real nature" is not yet known. And in the case
of the anthropocentric thinker whose spirituality
includes compassion, there may be the desire to
ameliorate the suffering not only of individual humans
but also of individual animals.
There are, however, aspects of our natural
environment which are ineluctably present to virtually
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adventure, and compassion, they are permanently of
great value to me spiritually, morally, and intellectually.
I will develop this topic further below when considering
the possible "deconstructive brncketing" of the agapetic
attitude.
The foregoing will repay some analysis. There are
two types of relation which I may have to the
experiences I have named. First, there is my
spontaneous unself-conscious response to particular
entities or situations in nature, and, second, there is my
reflection on a remembered moment of that selfforgetfulness before nature in wonder or concern, in
response to what I find aesthetically pleasing or to the
presence of mystery. In these latter indirect relations
to nature, I recall my capacity for and experiences of
self-forgetful appreciative response to other-thanhuman aspects of nature and the effects of these
responses within my mind and spirit. Moreover, in this
reflection on these experiences I find ingredients which
are of the highest importance to me: my wonder that
these objects and situations exist, my spontaneous
presupposition I did not make them, my desire to assume
a stewardship of them, and my vivid and cherished
memory that in these experiences I am totally taken up
with something not myself.
To be sure, some individuals may be unaware of,
uninterested in, or even repelled by the aspects of nature
which make these experiences possible for me. From
my observations of others I have concluded that these
persons seem to be "locked" within their own
experiences. Whatever they encounter in nature they
analyze as though its most significant aspect is that it is
their experience. I am reminded of a colleague who
during the 1940's, when American philosophy was
dominated by logical empiricism, instrumentalism,
critical realism, or a combination of these positions,
referred to a St. Bernard dog as a "gestalt." To be sure
an artist might on occasion speak of an animal in that
manner. But I knew this person's philosophical
preference and that his words were consciously intended
to communicate his experience of the dog as a
configuration of color, form, lines, and massive
presence. According to my lights, however, this
affectionate and intelligent animal possessed a very
interesting subjectivity of its own which I believed I
could discern only partially and indirectly.
There are a number of psychological, emotional,
experiential, educational, and spiritual reasons why an
individual might be capable only of an anti-realist
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interpretation of the physical world. This brings us to
criticism ofcontemporary approaches to nature, an area
of great significance for the spiritual and intellectual
development of individuals per se, scientific inquiry,
present-day philosophical creativity, ecological issues,
and all compassionate, humane considerations. Three
possible explanations of a preference for anti-realist
interpretations of sensory experiences are (1) the
narcissistic inability to take an interest in what is not
one's experience; (2) a lack of experience, knowledge,
or imagination concerning the multifaceted value of
interpreting these experiences as encounters with otherthan-human entities which merit our wonder,
appreciation, admiration, affection, and compassion;
and (3) the effects of acceptance of one or a combination
of the severnl forms of anti-realist anthropocentrism.
Before turning to consideration of the agapetic
attitude in respect to the higher animals, we recall that
some persons do not live in terms of an anthropocentric
perspective on the physical world but, rather, "see"
entities or situations in nature as having an objective
existence apart from their experience of them. The
capacity for this stance, however, is not always
accompanied by the agapetic attitude. One may desire
to achieve objective truth concerning nature yet be
interested only in the import which that truth has for
one's concerns. And having discerned this import, one
may be only exploitative of nature. On the other hand,
belief in some form of realism is necessary for
enlightened, appreciative interest in what I will call "the
whole animal", and I use that expression here to include
the animal's "real nature," which it possesses by virtue
of both its species and its idiosyncratic characteristics,
and also its subjectivity as well as its behavior and
appearance. Again, this may be a passive intereste.g., one's pleasure in contemplating what one believes
one has discerned about lions, horses, or chipmunks.
But it need not be passive; it may be a compassionate
and active concern for the animals' well-being-i.e., it
may be the agapetic attitude.

III. The Higher Animals and the Agapetic Attitude
Although none of the anthropocentric views is
adequate to support agapetic reflection on the animals,
some of these views have drawn attention to a
dimension of philosophical inquiry which is useful in
this context. From the several forms ofphenomenology,
existentialism, and instrumentalism we have learned
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that in some aspects of philosophical inquiry we not
only may but must draw on our personal experiences.
This I have done. In respect to what I believe I have
discerned of the interior life of animals, however, I am
able to be brief. For among those who have an
appreciation of animals, these experiences are well
known, although it is useful here to make explicit some
concrete details on which I have based my conclusions.
I believe that in the animals I find their enjoyment
of play; their delight in each other's companionship and
in that of the humans they trust and love; and their desire
to give and to receive affection in respect to other
animals and also to humans. I also believe I have found
in them concern for each other and some indication of
their concern for me when I have been distressed.
Again, I believe they have real emotional needs which
arise from their fears, insecurities, anxieties, and
physical pain, and, when I have been present on these
occasions, I believe they have looked fixedly into my
eyes not with peace and affection but with trust and
expectation that I will come to their aid.

not wanting others to reject the opportunity for learning
about the animals, for increasing the well-being of
animals, and for ameliorating some of their suffering.
(2) This possibility bestows on the agapetic person
the hope that in his encounter with animals he does not
meet only the content and ethos of his own spirit
projected on selected aspects of nature, although in the
case of the person who is not a philosopher this hope is
likely to remain unexamined. Besides his impulse to
foster the well-being of animals, the agapetic person at
least implicitly has an appreciation of the importance
to his intellect and spirit of his accepting the adventure
of discovery in respect to animal nature.
(3) Further, if there are animals to whom we are
able to render good service, whether these animals enjoy
being our companions or prefer to be alone in their
uncultivated environment, then perhaps both nonphilosopher and philosopher need to reflect thoroughly
and hopefully on the presupposition that we can
genuinely come to know at least some characteristics
of these animals. But how come to know them? Have
we not learned from several varieties of anthropocentrism that in our reflection on any aspect ofnature
we are reflecting only on our human experiences of
nature which are necessarily acculturated, and may be
idiosyncratic? Here, as it did above, a contemporary
deconstructionist approach comes to our aid. But now
we will use this approach specifically in respect to our
attitude toward the animals. Let us ask: What would
be lost to us if we were to give up the agapetic attitude
and supplant it with an indifference to the animals or
a willingness to exploit and dominate them? But let
us ask this question not only as intellectual exercise or
as deliberate challenge to a fairly widespread
interpretation of our relation to nature. Let us ask it,
rather, as a part of our effort to justify the agapetic
person's view that our observations are clues to the real
nature of the animals.
We may ask this question in respect to both our own
spirit and mind and our interpretation of those of others.
And we ask it for the sake of gaining support for the
hypothesis that the agapetic attitude has beneficial
effects on the valuational nature and the intellect of the
person who sustains it. Having tried this myself, I
believe that there is no lack of evidence that the
sustaining of the attitude has such effects. Thus, the
individual's kindly, inviting attitude toward an animal

IV. Intellectual and Spiritual Roles of the Agapetic
Attitude
In at least three ways the agapetic attitude serves
and is served by both the intellect and the spirit, whether
or not the individual who sustains the attitude is a
philosopher.
(1) Concerning the animals, the agapetic person
will endeavor to think clearly, cautiously, and with
integrity. For it is likely that spontaneously and
unreflectively he desires to minimize human action in
terms of a distorted conception of the nature of animals
and a willingness to dominate them destructively.
Hence, while implicitly he presupposes that he is able
to achieve some understanding of the subjectivity of
particular animals, ideally he is also willing to answer,
rather than ignore, the charge that in this belief he is
being anthropomorphic. For when this presupposition
is undefended, the agapetic attitude toward animals is
vulnerable. On the other hand, if his belief that he has
know ledge of the subjectivity of some animals can be
justified, then those who see this belief as anthropomorphic are rejecting opportunities to make
discoveries about animals and the capacities of animals
for subjective well-being or suffering. And, again,
ideally, the agapetic person is willing to point this out,
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As I have already suggested, the intellectuality and
spirituality of the agapetic attitude make for more
accurate and thorough discerning of what is before us
in the animals than is possible without that attitude. The
anti-realist believes that she cannot have knowledge or
empathetic awareness of the animals per se. She
discounts evidence that this belief is not true, although
the realist is likely to believe that the anti-realist finds
evidence in support of some form of realism in virtually
all her encounters with nature. On the other hand, the
realist whose spirit is not imbued with the agapetic
attitude and who is indifferent to, or who wishes to
exploit, the animals sees only what is of interest to her
and interprets what she sees in terms of her own
interests. This raises the question of whether the person
who, possessing the agapetic attitude, loves and wishes
for the well-being of what she observes, can be
intellectually "objective." Of course, the immaturity
or the pathology of love and concern lead to distortion
in observation. The person who is capable of mature
love and concern, however, wants to know what she
loves according to its own nature and not according to
her wishes.
There are also historical reasons for drawing the
agapetic attitude into philosophical reflection. My
spontaneous appreciation of this attitude was
encouraged when, upon first reading the Dialogues of
Plato, I found what seemed to me to be intimations of
our present-day experience with the attitude and its roles
in our lives. (Of course, one need not read Plato as I
am reading him, but I think there is no compelling
evidence against this reading.) I have in mind Plato's
interest in the love of truth, of the areas in which we
seek truth, and of the situations in which we use the
truth we achieve. Thus, Plato draws attention to the
lovers of philosophical truth: Diotima says of the
philosophers' achievement ofknowledge of the Ideas,
"And this, Socrates, is the final cause of all our former
toils...."2 Further, not all humans are philosophers, and
Diotima sees the fulfillment of the "birth of beauty" as
possible for persons who work faithfully with true
opinion. 3 In the "Symposium" there is an emphasis on
eros, i.e., on our spiritual as well as our intellectual needs
for truth, but there are other dialogues in which there is
a promise of fulfillment of our needs not in being served
by truth but in our serving truth. This is expressed, for
example, in many poignant lines in the "Republic": e.g.,
"Observe, Glaucon, there will be no injustice in
compelling our philosophers to have a care and a

can make a difference in the animal, freeing and
enabling it to develop and/or to reveal some
characteristics which otherwise might have remained
dormant or hidden. Also, the individual becomes a more
patient, discerning, and responsive observer of animals,
and perhaps of other aspects of nature. And his kindness
being reinforced by his awareness of the animals'
positive response to him, he may develop a new or
increased inclination to give kindness to humans.

V. The Relevance of the Agapetic Attitude to
Philosophical Inquiry
What may legitimately be said concerning the effects
of the agapetic attitude on philosophical reflection? In
part my conviction of the philosophical importance of
the agapetic attitude derives from my reflection on my
experience-i.e., my common sense experience with the
cultivation of that attitude; my experience which is derived
from my giving the attitude roles in my own philosophical
reflection; and my observing the effectiveness of the
attitude in the lives and the philosophical inquiry of those
philosophical colleagues in whose intellectual and
spiritual stance I believe I have discerned it. Thus, I
suggest that the agapetic attitude creates and develops in
the person who sustains it the desire and the intention to
encounter and to achieve some acquaintance with
responsive forms oflife that are not human. Furthermore,
this person has truly self-forgetful moments when he aims
to "bridge the species gap" in admiration, wonder,
compassion, affection, delight in the mutuality of the
companionship he has with some animals, his taking
advantage of opportunities for doing acts ofkindness for
them, and his discovery of the animals as loci of the
unknown and of mystery.
Further, the agapetic attitude needs to be continually
shaped by a realism and hence has significance for
realist/anti-realist issues. The realisms which support
the agapetic attitude, however, will be diversified. The
Hindu, Jew, Taoist, Christian, or naturalist may share
the agapetic attitude, but their views of the content and
structure of reality and of the investigative capabilities
of the human mind will not be the same. This fact has
a two-fold significance for contemporary philosophy.
It brings both Eastern and Western thought into
philosophical inquiry, thereby furthering the
development of world philosophy, and knowledge of
the de facto diversity of realist views may prevent a too
narrow development of interest in realism.
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providence of others."4 On the other hand, although it
could be cogently argued that agape is not unambiguously present in Plato's Dialogues, itis clear that agape
is present in Bonaventura's admonition that we should
not make the mistake of believing that "it suffices to
investigate without wonder, examine without
exaltation,...know without love.',5
There are at least two aspects of the historical
grounds for drawing the agapetic attitude into current
philosophical reflection. First, I have suggested above
that the view that investigative capacities increase
when they are fired by the zeal of the agapetic attitude
may become for us a philosophical hypothesis (i.e.,
not dogma, axiom, decision, or expression of
preference) and as such may be assessed, developed,
and defended by reference to our concrete experience
with it. Second, if support for this hypothesis can be
found, then this event may help introduce into
philosophical inquiry an endeavor to find in the
history of philosophy accomplishments which have
value for us today, even though they were conclusions
of minds educated within a culture incommensurate
with ours. Willingness to assess the hypothesis
concerning the permanent value of the agapetic attitude
could give new import to historical studies and to
societies dedicated to these studies.
Finally, those of us who teach and publish our
philosophical reflections may have significant effects
on the values and intellects of others. And one way we
can plant the seeds of more adequate philosophical

thought is by assessing for possible integration into our
reflection aspects of our everyday lives that are of
proven value to us yet are often ignored or rejected by
philosophical inquiry. For some of us the importance
of our agapetic attitude toward the higher animals is a
prime example of highly valued aspects of our concerns
upon which in our day philosophical significance is not
often bestowed. And in this essay we have noted several
areas ofphilosophy that might benefit substantially from
attention to this attitude: the philosophical need for
adequate observation of experience, issues of realism/
anti-realism, investigative roles of the thinker's attitude
toward his inquiry, and the improvement of our attitudes
to other-than-human aspects of nature and above all to
the higher animals.

Notes
1 See, for example, the "ethos" of Jacques Derrida's "I
have forgotten my umbrella."
2 Plato, "Symposium" in The Dialogues of Plato, trans.
by B. Jowett (New York: Random House, 1937), Vol. I.
p.334.

3

Ibid., page 331. (Steff. 206)

4

Plato, "RepUblic", Book vn. p. 779. Op. Cit.

S Saint Bonaventura, The Mind's Road to God, trans. by
George Boas (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), Prologue,
p.5.

I stare at tree-covered mountain across the way,
Shuddering at repeated volleys.
In those woods walks beauty
That can't be destroyed or dragged out by hunters.
They've cheated themselvesThe corpses on car hoods are devoid of the Presence
Still in the woods,
Shadows walking quietly with those who come in peace.
Betty Jabn

Between the Species

170

Summer 1991

